Swenson: Advances in Human Ecology, Vol. 6, 1997
End-directed Behavior Dependent on Meaning

There is an extremely important property of the intentional dynamics of living things, of the river that flows uphill, that remains to be addressed. At the beginning of this paper intentional dynamics was defined as end-directed behavior prospectively controlled, or determined by meaning, or information, about paths to ends, and this was contrasted with end-directed behavior which can be understood as determined by local potentials, and fundamental laws. Examples of the latter were a river flowing down a slope, or heat flowing down a gradient. We can elaborate this discussion, given what we have covered in the interceding pages, by including examples of autocatakinetic systems, for example, such as the Bénard experiment, tornadoes, and dust devils, systems that we call self-organizing, but we do not say are characterized by intentional dynamics. The autocatakinesis of such systems, which breaks symmetry with previously disordered regimes to access and dynamically fill higher-ordered dimensions of space time, is still determined with respect to local potentials with which they typically remains permanently connected. The autocatakinesis of living things, in contrast, is maintained with respect to non-local potentials, potentials discontinuously located in space-time to which they are not permanently connected (Swenson, 1991b, Swenson in press-a; Swenson & Turvey, 1991).
If we understand from universal principles that the world acts, in effect, to maximize its extension into space-time, to produce as much order as possible, we can see immediately what intentional dynamics provide. By providing the means for linking together or accessing and dissipating, discontinuously located, or non-local, potentials in the building of order, intentional dynamics provides access to vast regions of space-time otherwise inaccessible. Just as there is a qualitative leap in the transformation of disorder to order, intentional dynamics, with respect to the potentially accessible dimensions of space-time it offers, constitutes a symmetry-breaking or qualitative leap in terrestrial order production. Likewise, the origin of human cultural systems, which, with highly developed symbolic langauge, provides what may be thought of as intentional dynamics about intentional dynamics, and with it dramatic access to new dimensions of space-time, was also a terrestrial symmetry breaking event (see also Dyke's [this volume] discussion on the increase of space-time dimensions in human cultural systems).
In the section on evolution, it was shown that the assertion of evolutionary epistemologists that evolution constitutes a progressive knowledge acquisition process from amoeba to Einstein was an assertion that could not be made (nor accounted for) from the ground of Darwinian theory. According to Darwinian theory amoebae and Einsteins are incommensurable, and hence like Kuhnian paradigms, or generic closed-circles, incomparable. It was pointed out that evolution would have to be about something other than fitness to make the assertion that evolutionary epistemologists would like to make. Our understanding that from a universal standpoint terrestrial evolution is a planetary process about entropy production maximization, and as a consequence the filling of space-time dimensions, provides the principled basis to make the assertion. Terrestrial evolution is indeed a progressive knowledge acquisition process from amoeba to Einstein (more appropriately from Archean prokaryotes to the contemporary globalization of human culture), and what the system is learning, in effect, is the accessing of space-time dimensions.
But now the part that still needs explaining: If intentional dynamics are not determined by local potentials, then how are they determined? To simply say that they are meaningfully determined, at this point, begs the question. Autocatakinetics has the property of insensitivity to initial conditions, or macrodeterminacy, but what is the basis for the macrodeterminacy of intentional systems if not local potentials? The Bénard convection, which, in effect, "solves the packing problem" by producing a regular array of hexagonal cells during the course of its evolution or development can be understood in terms of the system's proximal relation to, or embeddedness within, a field of local potentials, but how is intentional behavior determined with respect to non-local or distal potentials? How does it solve the packing problem with respect to non-local potentials? What is the physical basis for the epistemic relations by which the accessibility of new space-time levels of order are effectively opened up? How, in other words, does one get from an otherwise meaningless world of extension, or usual physical description, to a meaningful world of intension, or information about?

From Extension to Intension

We return to our "first principles", in particular, first-law symmetry, second-law broken symmetry, and the law of maximum entropy production as ordering principle, for immediate clues. First, we recognize that, consistent with thermodynamic inquiry, the search here is for macroscopic observables. Autocatakinetic systems are macroscopic systems, embedded in macroscopic flow, and the search is thus not for "meaning" in individual particles, but macroscopic flow variables that capture invariant properties with relevance to intentional ends. Following the same methodology suggests further that the search for macroscopic observables involves a search for symmetry and broken symmetry‹for observables that capture the nomological relation between persistence and change of the distal objects of intention with respect to the proximal or local space-time position of the epistemic subject. It turns out this is exactly the insight of Gibson's (1979/1986; Swenson & Turvey, 1991; Turvey & Shaw,1995) ecological conception of information. The idea developed by Gibson with respect to animals and their environments, has now been extended to life in general, and embedded in a universal thermodynamic context by "neo Gibsonians," and, or "third-wave Gibsonians" (e.g., Peck, in press; Swenson in press-a; Swenson & Turvey, 1991; Turvey & Shaw, 1995). The core idea is deceivingly simple, but has profound explanatory consequences.
Living things are embedded in ambient energy flows (e.g., optical, mechanical, chemical) for which the mean energy content is extremely low relative to the energy used by living things from their on-board potentials to power their intentional acts. As a consequence of first-law symmetry, lawful or invariant relations exist between the macroscopic properties of such ambient energy distributions, and their sources, with the further consequence that the former can be used in the prospective control of intentional ends to specify or determine the latter. A chemical gradient that lawfully specifies the source of their food can be used by bacteria, diffusion fields of diffusing volatiles that lawfully specify the sources of their intentional ends may be used by animals, and fields of mechanical waves and optical fields can be used in similar ways.
A particularly crucial and widespread requirement for the intentional dynamics of many living things, for example, is the ability to effect controlled collisions (e.g., soft collisions with little or no momentum exchange as in a bird landing on a branch, hard collisions with substantial momentum exchange as when a predator attacks a prey, and collision avoidance where the ends of an intentional agent require that it not collide with particular things). The fact of first-law symmetry means that "information about" such collisions is lawfully carried in the ambient energy field (the "optical flow field") that transforms itself as a living thing moves through it. Just as in the Bénard case where local potentials, and laws of form specify the origin, production, and development of order, so too with non-local potentials and the invariant or epistemic properties of ambient energy flows with respect to intentional dynamics.
Following the case of controlled collisions further, for example, the time-to-contact (), as shown in Figure 9, is determined by the inverse of the relative rate of expansion of the optical flow
field, and the information

ecological psychology is a key part of human ecology

Figure 9. Time-to-contact,, is determined by the inverse of the relative rate of expansion of the optical flow field, A.

information about whether a collision will be hard or soft is given by the time derivative or rate of change of the relative rate of expansion () (Lee, 1980; Kim et al. 1993). In the case of a bird landing on a branch, and requiring a soft collision, for example, the rate of change must be . This example shows how a single macroscopic variable nomologically carried in the optic flow, can precisely determine the intentional dynamics of living things, in this case when a particular bird, for example, must open its wings to decelerate now so that it does not, in effect, crash into a branch later. This deceivingly simple understanding exposes the fact that, not only are the shapes and forms things assume nomologically determined by laws of form (e.g., that there is, within tolerance, a requisite ratio between flight muscle weight and body weight, or between wing span and body weight, or brain weight and body weight [e.g., Alexander, 1971]), but that information about or meaning carried in macroscopic flow variables nomologically determines the behavior of things towards their intentional ends.

CONCLUSION

Ecological science addresses the relations of living things to their environments, and the study of human ecology the particular case of humans. There is an opposing tradition built into the foundations of modern science of separating living things, and, in particular, humans from their environments. Beginning with Descartes' dualistic world view, this tradition found its way into biology by way of Kant, and evolutionary theory through Darwin, and manifests itself in two main postulates of incommensurability, the incommensurability between psychology and physics (the "first postulate of incommensurability"), and between biology and physics (the "second postulate of incommensurability").
The idea of the incommensurability between living things and their environments gained what seemed strong scientific backing with Boltzmann's view of the second law of thermodynamics as a law of disorder according to which the transformation of disorder to order was said to be infinitely improbable. If this were true, and until very recently it has been taken to be so, then the whole of life and its evolution becomes one improbable event after another. The laws of physics, on this view, predict a world that should be becoming more disordered, while terrestrial evolution is characterized by active order production. The world, on this view, seemed to consist of two incommensurable, or opposing "rivers", the river of physics which flowed down to disorder, and the river of biology, psychology, and culture, which "flowed up", working, it seemed, to produce as much order as possible.
As a consequence of Boltzmann's view of the second law, evolutionary theorists, right up to present times, have held onto the belief that "organic evolution was a negation of physical evolution" (Levins & Lewontin, 1985, p. 69), and that biology and culture, work somehow to "defy" the laws of physics (Dennett, 1995). With its definition of evolution as an exclusively biological process, Darwinism separates both biology and culture from their universal, or ecological, contexts, and advertises the Cartesian postulates of incommensurability at its core, postulates that are inimical to the idea of ecological science. An ecological science, by definition, assumes contextualization or embeddedness, and as its first line of business wants to know what the nature of it is. This requires a universal, or general theory of evolution which can uncover, and explicate the relationship of the two otherwise incommensurable rivers, and put the active ordering of biological, and cultural systems, of terrestrial evolution as a time-asymmetric process, back into the world.
The law of maximum entropy production, when coupled with the balance equation of the second law, and the general facts of autocatakinetics, provides the nomological basis for such a theory, and shows why, rather than living in a world where order production is infinitely improbable, we live in and are products of a world, in effect, that can be expected to produce as much order as it can. It shows how the two, otherwise incommensurable, rivers, physics on the one hand, and biology, psychology, and culture on the other, are part of the same universal process and how the fecundity principle, and the intentional dynamics it entails, are special cases of an active, end-directed world opportunistically filling dynamical dimensions of space-time as a consequence of universal law. The epistemic dimension, the urgency towards existence, in Leibniz's terms, characterizing the intentional dynamics of living things and expressed in the fecundity principle, and the process of evolution writ large as a single planetary process, is thus not only commensurable with first, or universal, principles, but a direct manifestation of them.
The view presented here, thus provides a principled basis for putting living things, including humans, back in the world, and recognizing living things and their environments as single irreducible systems. It provides the basis for contextualizing the deep and difficult questions concerning the place of humans, as both productions, and producers, of an active, and dynamic process of terrestrial evolution, which, as a consequence of the present globalization of culture is changing the face of the planet at a rate which seems to be without precedent over geological time. Of course, answers to questions such as these always lead to more questions, but such is the nature of the epistemic process we call life.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special thanks as always to the Center for the Ecological Study of Perception and Action and especially to Claudia Carello, Michael Turvey, and Bob Shaw for there work in providing an extraordinary environment conducive to the development of these ideas. Special thanks also to Lee Freese, Series Editor, and also Chuck Dyke for their perserverance in seeing that this article was brought to fruition. Preparation of this manuscript was supported in part b the National Science Foundation Grant # SBR9422650. All errors are mine.

NOTES

1. In fact, Descartes (1644/1975), recognizing the necessity of a conservation principle for a law-based world proposed the conservation of "motion," which he thought would still allow him to get around the problem of interactionism. He thought "mind" could interact with "matter" by changing its direction but not the quantity of motion. Motion, as Leibniz (1696/1925), pointed out, however, is not a conserved quantity. It is momentum which is conserved., and momentum is a vector the conservation of which, like the conservation of energy, would be violated by exogenous interaction.

2. It was Tait who first pointed out how counterintuitive it was to refer to the dissipated potential of a system as a quantity that increased, and he proposed reversing the sign so it would be possible to talk about entropy as the potential for change and thus being minimized. Maxwell picked up on this, but it never caught on. Because the idea of entropy increase is oftentimes hard to conceive, in this text I will often use "minimize the potential" in additon to or instead of "maximize the entropy". They should be take as equivalent expressions.

3. Since its coinage by Clausius to refer to the dissipated potential in a system the word "entropy" has taken on numerous, and non-physicall, as well as subjective, or observer-dependent quantities (e.g., Shannon's information "entropy") where the "entropy" of a system depends on what an individual knows about it. The reader should be aware that some authors illegitimately conflate these meanings. In the present paper, to be clear, the word entropy is used in its physical thermodynamic sense as defined.

REFERENCES

Alexander, R. 1971. Size and Shape. London: William Clowes & Sons, Ltd.
Aristotle 1947. "De anima." Pp. 163-329 in R. McKeon, ed., Introduction to Aristotle. New York: Random House.
Bertalanffy, L. von 1952. Problems of Life. London: Watts.
Boltzmann, L. 1974. "The Second Law of Thermodynamics." Pp. 13-32 in S.G. Brush, transl., Theoretical Physics and Philosophical Problems. Boston: D. Reidel Publishing. First published in 1886..
Bramwell, A. 1989. Ecology in the 20th Century: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Callebaut, W. & Pinxten, R., eds. 1987. Evolutionary Epistemology: A Multiparadigm Program. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Calvin, W. 1986. The River That Flows Uphill: A Journey from the Big Bang to t he Big Brain. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company
Campbell, D.T. 1987. "Evolutionary Epistemology." Pp. 47-89 in G. Radnitzky and W.W. Bartley III, eds., Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
Carneiro, R. 1970. "A Theory of the Origin of the State." Science, 169: 733-738.
Carneiro, R. 1981. "The Chiefdom: Precursor of the State." Pp. 37-79 in G. Jones and R. Kautz, eds., The Transition to Statehood in the New World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carneiro, R. 1987. "Village Splitting as a Function of Population Size." Pp. 94- 124 in L. Donald, ed., Themes in Ethnology and Culture History, Essays in Honor of David F. Aberle. Meerut, India: Archana Publications.
Cloud, P. 1988. Oasis in Space: Earth History from the Beginning. New York: Norton.
Darwin, C. 1937. On the Oigin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc. First published in 1859.
Dawkins, R. 1989. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. First published in 1976.
Dawkins, R. 1982. The Extended Phenotype. San Francisco: Freeman.
Dawkins, R. 1986. The Blind Watchmaker. New York: Freeman.
Dennett, D. 1995. Darwin's Dangerous Idea. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Depew, D. & Weber, B. 1995. Darwinism Evolving. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Descartes, R. 1975. "Conservation of Quantity of Motion." Pp. 234-266 in R. Lindsay, ed., Energy: Historical Development of the Concept, Benchmark Papers On Energy, Vol. 1. Stroudsburg, PA: Dowden, Hutchinson & Ross. First published in 1644.
Descartes, R. 1986. Discourse on Method and Meditations . L. Lafleur, trans. New York: Macmillan. First published in 1637.
Dyke, C. in press. Heuristics for ecological interaction. Advances in Human Ecology (this volume).
Eddington, A. 1958. The Nature Of The Physical World. Ann Arbor, MI: Ann Arbor Paperbacks.
Fisher, R.A. 1958. The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. New York: Dover. First published in 1930.
Gibson, J. J. 1986. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. First published in 1979.
Gould, S.J. 1989. Wonderful life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History. New York: W.H. Norton & Company.
Kim, N., Turvey, M.T., & Carello, C. 1993. "Optical Information About the Severity of Upcoming Collisions." Journal of Experimental Psychology, 19(1): 179-193.
Lange, F. 1950. The History of Materialism. New York: The Humanities Press. First published in 1877.
Lee, D. 1980. "A Theory of Visual Control of Braking Based on Information about Time-to- Collision. Perception, 5: 437 459.
Leibniz 1925. "Explanation of the New System of Communication Between Substances, by Way of Reply to What is said about it in the Journal of September 12, 1695." Pp. 319-330 in R. Latta, trans., The Monodology and other Philosophical Writings. London: Oxford University Press. First published in 1696.
Leibniz 1969. "On the Radical Origination of Things." Pp. 486 491 in L.E. Loemker, ed., G.W. Leibniz Philosophical Papers and Letters. Dordrecht- Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company. First published in 1697.
Leibniz 1953. "Monodology." Pp. 249-272 in G. Montgomery, transl., Leibniz. La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company. First published in 1714.
Levins, R. & Lewontin, R. 1985. The Dialectical Biologist. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lewontin, R. 1992. Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA. New York: Harper Collins.
Lorenz, K. 1973. Behind the Mirror: A Search for a Natural History of Human Knowledge. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Maruyama, M. 1963. "The Second Cybernetics: Deviation Amplifying Mutual Causal Processes." American Scientist 51: 164-179.
Margulis, L. 1982. Symbiosis in Cell Evolution. San Francisco: Freeman.
Margulis, L. & Lovelock, J. 1974. "The Biota as Ancient and Modern Modulator of the Earth's Atmosphere." Tellus, 26:1-10.
Margulis, L. & Sagan, D. 1995. What is Life? New York: Simon & Shuster.
Maynard-Smith, J. 1988. " Evolutionary Progress and Levels of Selection." Pp. 219-230 in M. Nitecki , ed., Evolutionary Progress. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Mayr, E. 1980. "Prologue: Some Thoughts on the History of the Evolutionary Synthesis." Pp. 1-48 in E. Mayr and W.B. Provine, eds., The Evolutionary Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mayr, E. 1985. "How Biology Differs from the Physical Sciences." Pp. 43-63 in D. Depew and B. Weber, eds., Evolution at a Crossroads. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Munz, P. 1985. Our Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge: Popper or Wittgenstein? London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Munz, P. 1987. "Philosophy and the Mirror of Rorty." Pp. 345 387 on G. Radnitzky and W.W. Bartley, eds., Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the Sociologyh of Knowledge. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
Peck, A.J. in press. "Hydrodynamics, Reactive Forces, and the Autocatakinetics of Hearing." Ecological Psychology.
Popper, K. 1985. Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
Popper, K. 1987. "Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind." Pp. 139-154 in G. Radnitzky and W.W. Bartley III, eds. Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
Prigogine, I. 1978. "Time, Structure, and Fluctuations." Science, 201: 777-785.
Radnitzky, G. & Bartley, W.W. III, eds. 1987. Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
Rescher, N. 1967. The Philosophy of Leibniz. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Salthe, S. 1985. Evolving Hierarchical Systems. New York: Columbia University Press.
Salthe, S. 1994. Evolution and Development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Schröedinger, E. 1945. What is Life? New York: Macmillan.
Schwartzman, D., Shore, S., Volk, T. & McMenamin, M. 1994. "Self- Organization of the Earth's Biosphere Geochemical or Geophysiological?" Origins of Life and Evolution of the Biosphere 24: 435-450.
Schweber, S. 1985. "The wider British Context of Darwin's Theorizing." Pp. 35- 69 in D. Kohn, ed., The Darwinian Heritage. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Spencer, H. 1852. "The Social Organism". Westminster Review 57:468-501.
Sober, E. 1984. The Nature of Selection: Evolutionary Theory in Philosophical Focus. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books.
Spencer, H. 1892."Progress, Its Law and Cause." Pp. 8-38 in H. Spencer, Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative. New York: D. Appleton and Company. First published in 1857.
Spencer, H. 1862. First Principles. London: Williams and Norgate.
Swenson, R. 1988. "Emergence and the Principle of Maximum Entropy Production: Multi-Level System Theory, Evolution, and Non-Equilibrium Thermodynamics." Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Meeting of the International Society for General Systems Research, 32.
Swenson, R. 1989a. "Engineering Initial Conditions in a Self Producing Environment." Pp. 68-73 in M. Rogers and N. Warren, eds., A Delicate Balance: Technics, Culture and Consequences (IEEE Catalog No. 89CH2931-4). Los Angeles: Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers.
Swenson, R. 1989b. "Emergent Evolution and the Global Attractor: The Evolutionary Epistemology of Entropy Production Maximization." Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the International Society for the Systems Sciences 33(3): 46-53.
Swenson, R. 1989c. "Emergent Attractors and the Law of Maximum Entropy Production." Systems Research 6:187-1987.
Swenson, R. 1990. "Evolutionary Systems and Society." World Futures, 30: 11- 16.
Swenson, R. 1991a. "End-Directed Physics and Evolutionary Ordering: Obviating the Problem of the Population of One." Pp. 41-60 in F. Geyer, ed., The Cybernetics of Complex Systems: Self-Organization, Evolution, and Social Change. Salinas, CA: Intersystems Publications.
Swenson, R. 1991b. "Order, Evolution, and Natural Law: Fundamental Relations in Complex System Theory." Pp. 125 148 in C. Negoita, ed., Cybernetics and Applied Systems. New York: Marcel Dekker Inc.
Swenson, R. 1992. "Autocatakinetics, Yes‹Autopoiesis, No: Steps Towards a Unified Theory of Evolutionary Ordering." International Journal of General Systems, 21(2): 207-228.
Swenson, R. 1996. "Thermodynamics and Evolution." In G. Greenberg and M. Haraway, eds., The Encyclopedia of Comparative Psychology. New York: Garland Publishers, Inc.
Swenson, R. in press-a. "Spontaneous Order, Evolution, and Autocatakinetics: The Nomological Basis for the Emergence of Meaning." In G. van de Vijver, S. Salthe, and M. Delpos, eds., Evolutionary Systems.
Swenson, R. in press-b. "Evolutionary Theory Developing: The Problem(s) with 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea'. Ecological Psychology.
Swenson, R. in press-c. Spontaneous Order, Evolution, and Natural Law: An Introduction to the Physical Basis for an Ecological Psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates.
Swenson, R. and Turvey, M.T. 1991. "Thermodynamic Reasons for Perception- Action Cycles." Ecological Psychology, 3(4): 317-348
.
Turner, J. & Maryanski, A. 1979. Functionalism. Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin/Cummings.
Turvey, M.T. & Shaw, R.E. 1995. "Towards an Ecological Physics and a Physical Psychology." Pp. 144-169 in R. Solso and D. Massero, eds., The Science of the Mind: 2001 and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vernadsky, V. 1986. The Biosphere. London: Synergetic Press. First published in 1929.
Williams, G. 1992. Natural Selection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.